To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

86 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017

See all articles by Fernanda Brollo

Fernanda Brollo

University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Pedro Forquesato

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)

Juan Carlos Gozzi

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

Date Written: October 2017

Abstract

We analyze how political discretion affects the selection of government workers, using individual-level data on political party membership and matched employer-employee data on the universe of formal workers in Brazil. Exploiting close mayoral races, we find that winning an election leads to an increase of over 40% in the number of members of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy. Employment of members of the ruling party increases relatively more in senior positions, but also expands in lower-ranked jobs, suggesting that discretionary appointments are used both to influence policy-making and to reward supporters. We find that party members hired after their party is elected tend be of similar or even higher quality than members of the runner-up party, contrary to common perceptions that political appointees are less qualified. Moreover, the increased public employment of members of the ruling party is long-lasting, extending beyond the end of the mayoral term.

Keywords: bureaucracy, patronage, political parties, public sector employment

JEL Classification: D72, D73, H70, J45

Suggested Citation

Brollo, Fernanda and Forquesato, Pedro and Gozzi, Juan Carlos, To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil (October 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028937

Fernanda Brollo

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Pedro Forquesato

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) ( email )

Brazil

Juan Carlos Gozzi (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/juan-carlos-gozzi.htm

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
rank
342,249
Abstract Views
374
PlumX Metrics