Strategy-proof and Group Strategy-proof Stable Mechanisms: An Equivalence

11 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2017 Last revised: 29 Mar 2019

See all articles by Antonio Romero-Medina

Antonio Romero-Medina

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Matteo Triossi

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Management

Date Written: December 19, 2018

Abstract

We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.

Keywords: Multi-unit demand; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Group Strategy-proofness

JEL Classification: C78; D78

Suggested Citation

Romero-Medina, Antonio and Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria, Strategy-proof and Group Strategy-proof Stable Mechanisms: An Equivalence (December 19, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3030175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3030175

Antonio Romero-Medina

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126-128
Getafe, Madrid 28903
Spain

Matteo Maria Triossi Verondini (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Management ( email )

San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
86
Abstract Views
678
rank
361,455
PlumX Metrics