Social Pressure, Transparency, and Voting in Committees

34 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2017 Last revised: 13 Oct 2017

See all articles by Alvaro Name Correa

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Huseyin Yildirim

Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 4, 2017

Abstract

We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by partisan observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that such social pressure, like optimal taxation, can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, institutions may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative.

Keywords: Committee, Blame, Transparency, Social Pressure

JEL Classification: D02, D71, D91

Suggested Citation

Name Correa, Alvaro and Yildirim, Huseyin, Social Pressure, Transparency, and Voting in Committees (September 4, 2017). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032573 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3032573

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Huseyin Yildirim (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1805 (Phone)
919-684-8974 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
42
Abstract Views
236
PlumX Metrics