Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

114 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2017 Last revised: 31 Aug 2018

See all articles by David E. Broockman

David E. Broockman

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science

Greg Ferenstein

Independent

Neil A. Malhotra

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: September 1, 2018

Abstract

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites’ political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites’ influence affect inequality depends on which industry’s elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions.

Suggested Citation

Broockman, David E. and Ferenstein, Gregory and Malhotra, Neil A., Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs (September 1, 2018). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-61, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3032688

David E. Broockman (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.davidbroockman.com

Gregory Ferenstein

Independent ( email )

Neil A. Malhotra

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
339
Abstract Views
2,143
rank
99,193
PlumX Metrics