Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach

25 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2002

See all articles by Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Duke University - Department of Economics

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College, Department of Economics

Date Written: Februray 2002

Abstract

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

Suggested Citation

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Unver, Utku, Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach (Februray 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=303359 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303359

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Utku Unver (Contact Author)

Boston College, Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
6175640771 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

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