Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

National Tax Regulation, International Standards and the GATS: Argentina—Financial Services

28 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2017  

Panagiotis Delimatsis

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg Law School

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2017

Abstract

Can a WTO Member discriminate against foreign suppliers of services located in jurisdictions that refuse to share information with a government to permit it to determine if its nationals engage in tax evasion? Does it matter if the Member uses standards developed by an international body as the criterion for deciding whether to impose measures? In Argentina—Financial Services the WTO Appellate Body held that services from jurisdictions that share financial tax information may be different from services provided by jurisdictions that do not cooperate in supplying such information. It overruled a Panel finding that measures to increase taxes on financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions were discriminatory. We argue that the AB reached the right conclusion but that an important opportunity was missed to clarify what WTO Members are permitted to do to enforce their domestic regulatory regimes, and how international standards could have a bearing on this question. By giving consideration to arguments that the likeness of services and service suppliers may be a function of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes, the AB increased the scope for confusion and future litigation.

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Tax Havens; International Regulatory Cooperation; Information Exchange; Transparency

JEL Classification: F38; F51; G28; H26; H87

Suggested Citation

Delimatsis, Panagiotis and Hoekman, Bernard, National Tax Regulation, International Standards and the GATS: Argentina—Financial Services (September 2017). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2017/42. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033853

Panagiotis Delimatsis (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Postbus 90153
Tilburg, NL-5000 LE
Netherlands
0031 13 466 8251 (Phone)
0031 13 466 8047 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/webwijs/show/?uid=p.delimatsis

Tilburg Law School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Postbus 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
92