Network Hazard and Bailouts

80 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2017 Last revised: 29 Oct 2019

See all articles by Selman Erol

Selman Erol

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Date Written: October 28, 2019

Abstract

This paper studies a model of firms with endogenous bilateral exposures and government bailouts. It is shown that the anticipation of bailouts makes firms less concerned with the counterparty choices of their counterparties. This “network hazard” gives rise to large central firms. Bailouts can mitigate contagion but they can not restore output losses. Consequently, idiosyncratic bad shocks to large central firms generate large welfare losses. As such, bailouts create welfare volatility and systemic risk. Surprisingly, moral hazard on risk-return dimension is mitigated by bailouts. Ex-ante regulations can induce discontinuous changes in the network.

Keywords: Contagion, Strategic Network Formation, Strong Stability, Interconnectedness, Core-periphery, Systemic Risk, Volatility, Bailouts, Network Hazard, Moral Hazard, Federal Reserve Act

JEL Classification: D85, G01, H81

Suggested Citation

Erol, Selman, Network Hazard and Bailouts (October 28, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3034406

Selman Erol (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
263
Abstract Views
1,139
rank
120,453
PlumX Metrics