Management as the sine qua non for M&A Success

99 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2017 Last revised: 6 Dec 2020

See all articles by Manthos D. Delis

Manthos D. Delis

Audencia Business School

Maria Iosifidi

University of Surrey - Surrey Business School

Pantelis Kazakis

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School

Steven Ongena

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; KU Leuven; NTNU Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mike Tsionas

Lancaster University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 5, 2020

Abstract

This paper studies whether management quality in acquiring firms determines merger and acquisition (M&A) success. We model management practices as an unobserved (latent) variable in a standard microeconomic model of the firm and derive firm-year management estimates. We show that our measure is among the most important determinants of value creation in M&A deals. Our results are robust to the inclusion of acquirer fixed effects, to a large set of control variables, and to several other sensitivity tests. We also show that management explains, albeit to a lesser extent, acquirers’ return on equity and Tobin’s q.

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, Management practices, Acquirer returns

JEL Classification: G14, G34, J24

Suggested Citation

Delis, Manthos D. and Iosifidi, Maria and Kazakis, Pantelis and Ongena, Steven R. G. and Tsionas, Efthymios G., Management as the sine qua non for M&A Success (December 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3035192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3035192

Manthos D. Delis (Contact Author)

Audencia Business School ( email )

8 Road Joneliere
BP 31222
Nantes Cedex 3, 44312
France

Maria Iosifidi

University of Surrey - Surrey Business School ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 8DN
United Kingdom

Pantelis Kazakis

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School ( email )

Adam Smith Business School
Gilbert Scott Building
Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/panteliskazakis/home

Steven R. G. Ongena

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, 8001
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

NTNU Business School ( email )

Norway

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Efthymios G. Tsionas

Lancaster University ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

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