New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310

Posted: 20 May 2002

See all articles by Jeffrey L. Coles

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance

Chun Keung (Stan) Hoi

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Accounting and Finance

Abstract

We examine the relation between a board's decision to reject anti-takeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by non-executive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, State Anti-takeover Laws, Labor Market, Board of Directors

JEL Classification: G30, G34, J40, J41

Suggested Citation

Coles, Jeffrey L. and Hoi, Chun Keung (Stan), New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=303559

Jeffrey L. Coles

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-587-9093 (Phone)

Chun Keung (Stan) Hoi (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Saunders College of Business
105 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5608
United States
585-475-2718 (Phone)
585-475-6920 (Fax)

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