New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
Posted: 20 May 2002
We examine the relation between a board's decision to reject anti-takeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by non-executive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, State Anti-takeover Laws, Labor Market, Board of Directors
JEL Classification: G30, G34, J40, J41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation