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Assignment Maximization

30 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2017 Last revised: 18 Feb 2018

Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Sabanci University

Inácio Bó

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Bertan Turhan

Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)

Date Written: February 1, 2018

Abstract

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated – in terms of numberof assignments – in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.

Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Maximal Matching, Fairness, Object Allocation, School Choice

JEL Classification: D47, C78, D63

Suggested Citation

Afacan, Mustafa Oguz and Bó, Inácio and Turhan, Bertan, Assignment Maximization (February 1, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3036416

Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Sabanci University ( email )

Faculty of Art and Social Sciences
Orhanli Tuzla
İstanbul, 34956
Turkey

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

Bertan Turhan

Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM) ( email )

Av Camino a Santa Teresa 930, Magdalena Contreras
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, Federal District 10700
Mexico

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