Risk Hedging and Retail Competition: The Case of Electricity Markets

Posted: 25 Sep 2017

See all articles by Stephane Goutte

Stephane Goutte

University Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, CEMOTEV, UVSQ.

Raphaël Boroumand

PSB Paris School of Business

Date Written: September 13, 2017

Abstract

The advent of retail competition in the energy industry was concomitant with the explicit emergence of energy suppliers. The latter buys electricity on the wholesale market or contractually from producers and resells it to its customers. The “textbook model” of competitive decentralized energy markets required the vertical separation of generation, retail, as well as network activities (transmission and distribution).

Keywords: Hedging, Electricity

Suggested Citation

Goutte, Stephane and Boroumand, Raphaël, Risk Hedging and Retail Competition: The Case of Electricity Markets (September 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036682

Stephane Goutte (Contact Author)

University Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, CEMOTEV, UVSQ. ( email )

47 Boulevard Vauban
Guyancourt, 78280
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/mathgoutte/

Raphaël Boroumand

PSB Paris School of Business ( email )

59 rue Nationale
Paris, 75013
France

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