Doping in Teams: A Simple Decision Theoretic Model

Discussion Paper of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2017

10 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2017

Date Written: June 2017

Abstract

A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team member that at least some of its members dope. That there are not many proven cases of doping in team sports could be because doping is less effective or because the incentives to cover it are higher than in individual sports.

Keywords: Decision, Doping, Sports, Team

JEL Classification: D81, D82, K42, L83, Z20, Z22

Suggested Citation

Dilger, Alexander, Doping in Teams: A Simple Decision Theoretic Model (June 2017). Discussion Paper of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3036903

Alexander Dilger (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Institute for Organisational Economics
Scharnhorststr. 100
Münster, D-48151
Germany
+49-251-83-25330 (Phone)
+49-251-83-28429 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/io/en/organisation/Dilger.html

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