Resisting Persuasion

29 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2017 Last revised: 23 Feb 2020

See all articles by Elias Tsakas

Elias Tsakas

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: September 15, 2017

Abstract

Agents that are subject to persuasion attempts often employ strategies that allow them to effectively resist. In the context of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), we argue that if appropriate action-contingent payoff adjustments are available to the subject of persuasion (e.g., through public commitment), then payoff improvements are achieved. Remarkably, payoff-improving resistance strategies need not involve adding benefits to any action. We characterize the optimal resistance strategy when only costly payoff adjustments are allowed and we show that it always induces a substantial increase in the agent's welfare and it often induces the design of a perfectly informative signal.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Resistance, Uncertainty, Public Commitment

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83, K40, M38

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Elias and Tsakas, Nikolas and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Resisting Persuasion (September 15, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3037349

Elias Tsakas

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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