The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Developing Economies

HAQUE, F., ARUN, TG., & KIRKPATRICK, C. (2011) The political economy of corporate governance in developing economies: The case of Bangladesh. Research in International Business and Finance 25, 169-182.

33 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2017

See all articles by Faizul Haque

Faizul Haque

Edinburgh Business School

Thankom Gopinath Arun

University of Central Lancashire

Colin Kirkpatrick

University of Manchester - Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM)

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

The paper investigates the influence of concentrated shareholding, boardroom politics and interest group politics in the quality of corporate governance in listed firms. It finds that the controlling shareholders exert influence in boardroom politics through family-aligned board and executive management. The evidence shows that concentrated ownership, family-aligned board and management, and political connection(s) of the controlling shareholder(s) tend to be inversely associated with the quality of corporate governance in a firm. The findings of the study suggest that the broad-based interest group politics which influence political preference, and corporate control politics contribute significantly to the current state of corporate governance in developing economies.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Political Economy, Interest Group Politics, Asia, Bangladesh

JEL Classification: G30, K22, K42, L20

Suggested Citation

Haque, Faizul and Arun, Thankom Gopinath and Kirkpatrick, Colin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Developing Economies (2011). HAQUE, F., ARUN, TG., & KIRKPATRICK, C. (2011) The political economy of corporate governance in developing economies: The case of Bangladesh. Research in International Business and Finance 25, 169-182. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037919

Faizul Haque (Contact Author)

Edinburgh Business School ( email )

Riccarton
Edinburgh, Scotland EH14 4AS
United Kingdom

Thankom Gopinath Arun

University of Central Lancashire ( email )

United Kingdom

Colin Kirkpatrick

University of Manchester - Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) ( email )

Manchester M13 9GH
United Kingdom
0161 275 2808 (Phone)
0161 273 8829 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
591
PlumX Metrics