A Proposal for a Structural Remedy for Illegal Collusion

29 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2017

Date Written: July 31, 2017

Abstract

It is proposed that competition authorities use a structural remedy for some convicted cartels. The remedy would have cartel member(s) sell productive assets such as capacity to other firms for the purpose of making the market more competitive. Compared to existing corporate penalties of government fines and customer damages, divestiture is more of a deterrent under certain conditions, can be more effective at compensating those consumers harmed, and, most importantly, is corrective by reducing the likelihood of recidivism and preventing post-cartel tacit collusion. The paper offers some guidance for the use of divestitures, examines the legal basis for such a remedy, and discusses several cases for which a structural remedy may have been feasible and appropriate.

Keywords: Collusion, Antitrust, Competition Law, Penalties

JEL Classification: K21, L13

Suggested Citation

Harrington Jr, Joseph E., A Proposal for a Structural Remedy for Illegal Collusion (July 31, 2017). Antitrust Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038174

Joseph E. Harrington Jr (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19102
Philadelphia, PA 19104

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