Getting Less: When Negotiating Harms Post-Agreement Performance

Posted: 20 Sep 2017

See all articles by Einav Hart

Einav Hart

George Mason University - School of Business; University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department

Date Written: September 18, 2017

Abstract

In contrast to prior work that has assumed that negotiated agreements represent the economic value of negotiation outcomes, we demonstrate that the negotiation process can influence post-agreement behavior in a way that changes the economic value of the agreement. Our findings have particular relevance for negotiations for services, and fill a critical gap in our understanding of how negotiations influence performance. Across four studies, we demonstrate that negotiations can harm post-agreement behavior on both effortful and creative tasks. Specifically, we find that wage negotiations can harm productivity. Perceptions of conflict mediate the relationship between engaging in a negotiation and diminished motivation. Compared to not negotiating, individuals who negotiate may secure favorable deal terms, but risk incurring affective, relational, and economic costs. We call for future work to explore negotiations across a broader context of domains (e.g., negotiations for services in addition to goods) and to investigate how the negotiation process affects subsequent behavior (e.g., the provision of services). Our findings suggest that individuals should enter negotiations with caution.

Keywords: negotiation, productivity, conflict, reciprocity

Suggested Citation

Hart, Einav and Hart, Einav and Schweitzer, Maurice E., Getting Less: When Negotiating Harms Post-Agreement Performance (September 18, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3039256 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039256

Einav Hart (Contact Author)

George Mason University - School of Business ( email )

Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://einavh.art

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://EinavH.art

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4776 (Phone)
215-898-3664 (Fax)

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