The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

Posted: 24 Apr 2002

See all articles by Carol Mansfield

Carol Mansfield

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER)

George Van Houtven

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER)

Joel C. Huber

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Abstract

Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This paper presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community, and opportunities for siting may be missed.

Keywords: facility siting, collective action, NIMBY

Suggested Citation

Mansfield, Carol and van Houtven, George and Huber, Joel C., The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=303959

Carol Mansfield (Contact Author)

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER) ( email )

3040 Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194
United States

George Van Houtven

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER) ( email )

3040 Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194
United States

Joel C. Huber

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7785 (Phone)

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