Politicizing Consumer Credit

61 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2017 Last revised: 15 May 2018

See all articles by Pat Akey

Pat Akey

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Rawley Heimer

Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business

Stefan Lewellen

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Date Written: May 15, 2018

Abstract

Consumer credit access decreases by 4.5% to 8% when a borrower's home-state U.S. Senator chairs a powerful Senate committee. Credit access declines because lenders connected to powerful politicians feel protected and hence view fair-lending regulations as being less binding. We find that credit access declines in neighborhoods subject to Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) lending requirements, and lenders' CRA exam ratings also decline. Finally, lender profitability increases after credit is reallocated away from high-risk borrowers and minorities. Our findings suggest that powerful politicians can protect constituents from costly regulations and contrast with recent findings that government interventions expand credit supply.

Keywords: Access to Credit, Household Finance, Political Connections, Community Reinvestment Act

JEL Classification: G21, D72

Suggested Citation

Akey, Pat and Heimer, Rawley and Lewellen, Stefan, Politicizing Consumer Credit (May 15, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042896 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3042896

Pat Akey

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Rawley Heimer (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3706
United States

Stefan Lewellen

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

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