Dividing Resources by Flexible Majority Rules

University of Heidelberg Discussion Paper No. 373

19 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2002

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

We examine the division of resources among individuals by flexible majority rules where the majority necessary to adopt a proposal depends on the proposal itself. For instance, the size of the majority may increase with the maximal difference between the shares individuals receive. For large discount factors such rules imply an efficient and even distribution of resources. For low discount factors flexible majority rules supplemented by specific agenda-setting rules such as agenda rights for the opposition guarantee envy-free distribution. Uncertainty about discount rates can make it easier to achieve efficient and envy-free allocations.

Keywords: Flexible majority rules, division of resources, unanimity rule, simple majority rule, fair division

JEL Classification: D72, D70

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans, Dividing Resources by Flexible Majority Rules (January 2002). University of Heidelberg Discussion Paper No. 373. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304321

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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