Good Banks, Bad Banks

31 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2017

See all articles by Richard Christopher Whalen

Richard Christopher Whalen

Economic Advisory Committee of FINRA; Indiana State University - Networks Financial Institute; Association of Private Enterprise Education (APEE); National Association of Business Economists (NABE)

Date Written: September 27, 2017


This paper examines the factors which contribute to banks being perceived as being “good” or “bad” in terms of their impact on the political economy and society as a whole. We first review some of the historical antecedents for public approbation against banks, then consider how changes in ownership affect bank behavior, then examine the financial performance of different sized banks, and then finally discuss the particular examples of off-balance sheet transactions and incomplete sales as indicia of cheating by “bad banks.” We conclude with a discussion of financial conflicts as prohibited by the Volcker Rule and the larger question of corruption and crony capitalism between the largest banks, elected officials and their regulators.

Keywords: Banks, Federal Reserve, True Sale, Capital, Fraud, off-balance sheet, crony capitalism, regulation, Louis Brandeis, JP Morgan, Walker Todd

JEL Classification: G00, G18, G2, G21, G23, G38, G32, N00, N2

Suggested Citation

Whalen, Richard Christopher, Good Banks, Bad Banks (September 27, 2017). Available at SSRN: or

Richard Christopher Whalen (Contact Author)

Economic Advisory Committee of FINRA ( email )

1735 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
United States


Indiana State University - Networks Financial Institute ( email )

Terre Haute, IN 47809
United States


Association of Private Enterprise Education (APEE) ( email )

313 Fletcher Hall, Dept. 6106
615 McCallie Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37403-2598
United States

HOME PAGE: http://

National Association of Business Economists (NABE) ( email )

1920 L St. NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036
United States


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