An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights

16 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2017

See all articles by Atsushi Tsuneki

Atsushi Tsuneki

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: September 22, 2017

Abstract

We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment. We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the investment conferred by the owner but also on the reliance investment provided by the trespasser. The resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences shows that the endowment effect hardwired to the owners and trespassers depends on the difference of productivities among both parties and the density of owners within the population.

Keywords: Evolutionary Game, Property Right, Reliance Investment, Endowment Effect

JEL Classification: C73, K11

Suggested Citation

Tsuneki, Atsushi, An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights (September 22, 2017). ISER Discussion Paper No. 1010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3044262

Atsushi Tsuneki (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

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