The Relative Performance Puzzle

22 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2002

See all articles by Ernst G. Maug

Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

The accepted theoretical models of executive compensation contracts all seem to imply that optimal remuneration packages should contain a relative performance element. The puzzle is that the empirical literature has found remarkably little relative performance evaluation. This paper aims at resolving this puzzle by introducing the notion that the manager can trade on assets other than her own company's stock. Then the manager's portfolio strategy always adjusts for the risks of her compensation contract and she replaces the firm's benchmark with a - home-made - benchmark. She chooses exactly the weights and the compensation of the benchmark that would otherwise be chosen in an optimal contract. In many cases this is possible without short selling any assets. To the extent that performance benchmarks are correlated with traded assets they are redundant for the optimal contract. Accounting benchmarks are exempt from this verdict since they may help to insure the manager against risks that are not related to traded assets. This may help to understand the presence of relative performance elements in annual bonus plans.

Keywords: Executive Compensation

JEL Classification: G30, M52

Suggested Citation

Maug, Ernst G., The Relative Performance Puzzle. Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 52, 99. 3-24, January 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304449

Ernst G. Maug (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim Business School ( email )

L9, 1-2
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
+49 621 181-1952 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cf.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/de/people/maug/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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