Expected Issuance Fees and Market Liquidity

41 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2017 Last revised: 12 Nov 2018

See all articles by Boyd Buis

Boyd Buis

The Royal Bank of Scotland - NatWest Markets

Mary Pieterse-Bloem

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Willem F. C. Verschoor

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Remco C. J. Zwinkels

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: November 12, 2018

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of expected issuance fees on market liquidity in the Euro-area government bond market. Investment banks have a dual role as primary dealer in the secondary market as well as competitor for lead manager in the primary market. Primary dealers have the incentive to increase liquidity due to competition for issuance fees because lead managers are selected based on their liquidity provision in the secondary market. We find that the expected issuance fee is significantly related to market liquidity. Issuance fee driven liquidity is especially strong for countries with high funding needs, in periods of high uncertainty, and for bonds with high search costs.

Keywords: sovereign bonds; market microstructure; market liquidity; issuance fee

JEL Classification: G12; G18; G24

Suggested Citation

Buis, Boyd and Pieterse-Bloem, Mary and Verschoor, Willem F. C. and Zwinkels, Remco C.J., Expected Issuance Fees and Market Liquidity (November 12, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3045453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3045453

Boyd Buis

The Royal Bank of Scotland - NatWest Markets ( email )

250 Bishopsgate
London, EC2M 4AA
United Kingdom

Mary Pieterse-Bloem

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Willem F. C. Verschoor

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081 HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Remco C.J. Zwinkels (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://tinbergen.nl/person/1574/remco-zwinkels

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
280
Abstract Views
1,820
Rank
213,748
PlumX Metrics