The Political Economy of Finance

35 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2002

See all articles by Marco Pagano

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Paolo F. Volpin

City University London - Faculty of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to persist over time. A recent strand of research has shown that some progress on these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this Paper we offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking and securities markets. development, privatization

Keywords: Political economy, shareholder protection, corporate governance, bankruptcy law, credit market regulation, financial

JEL Classification: G28, G38, K22, K42

Suggested Citation

Pagano, Marco and Volpin, Paolo F., The Political Economy of Finance (February 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3231. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304643

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)

Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Paolo F. Volpin

City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )

London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

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