Meritocracy, Efficiency, Incentives and Voting in Cooperative Production: A Survey

26 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2017 Last revised: 20 Nov 2017

See all articles by Carmen Bevia

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante

Luis C. Corchón

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 19, 2017

Abstract

This paper surveys selectively several contributions to the understanding of how cooperatives may cope with the interplay between meritocracy and efficiency when public decisions are taking by voting and the supply of labor is freely decided by each member. This outlines the main trade-off faced by cooperatives.

In particular, the degree of meritocracy is limited by three factors:

1) Efficiency because too much meritocracy encourages too much work from the socially optimal point of view.

2) Meritocracy encourages sabotage.

3) Voting because workers may prefer inefficient reward schemes as long as they are individually profitable.

Suggested Citation

Bevia, Carmen and Corchón Diaz, Luis Carlos, Meritocracy, Efficiency, Incentives and Voting in Cooperative Production: A Survey (November 19, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047797 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3047797

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente, sn
Alicante, 03690
Spain

Luis Carlos Corchón Diaz (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
175
PlumX Metrics