Spinoza and International Law: Bleak Take on Self-Help or a Strong Belief in Humanity?

Abstract

Spinoza foresees a state of nature among states, just like the one among human beings. Human beings, under this chaotic condition, are not bound by the contracts they have concluded, if these contracts have lost their utility. States, too, may cease to observe those international agreements, if obedience to these is not advantageous any more for the state concerned, or whenever there is a more advantageous alternative than those perks offered by the international agreement. These findings have led many scholars of International Relations and International Law to deem Spinoza as a thinker in the mold of Hobbes or the like, someone who allocates no place for morality in political affairs.

Spinoza proves at times to be a stingier critic of morality than Hobbes, yet he still calls for cooperation on international fora. This he does by distancing himself from the rhetoric of natural law. International solidarity, according to him, will enable participating states to be more powerful and to enjoy more rights. Yet again, he does not set idealistic goals and just underlines the more advantageous state to be created owing to the establishment of such a peaceful cooperation.

Keywords: Spinoza, Public International Law, International Legal Theory

JEL Classification: K33