The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

KUL-CES Econometics Working Paper No. 2002/03/02

8 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2002

See all articles by Laszlo A. Koczy

Laszlo A. Koczy

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS); Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Date Written: March 22, 2002

Abstract

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (GEB,1996). We show that for the class of TU games with non-empty cores the core can be reached via a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

Keywords: dynamic cooperative game, indirect dominance, core

JEL Classification: C71, C73

Suggested Citation

Koczy, Laszlo A., The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (March 22, 2002). KUL-CES Econometics Working Paper No. 2002/03/02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304961

Laszlo A. Koczy (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS) ( email )

Budaörsi 45
Budapest, H-1112
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.mtakti.hu/en/kutatok/laszlo-a-koczy/276/

Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar Tudósok krt. 2.
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://qsms.mokk.bme.hu/index.php/koczy/

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