Neither Strategic Nor Selfish: Individualistic Negotiators and Their Behavior Over Time

18 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2002

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

Individualistically-oriented negotiators do worse than cooperatively-oriented negotiators, even when they are engaging in similar behaviors. This paper proposes and test hypotheses about negotiators' motivations and their behaviors in a repeated measures design. Individualistic negotiators appear to be neither selfish nor strategic: they do not consistently use distributive behaviors oriented only towards their own goals nor do they begin at the same level of distributive behavior use as cooperative negotiators and increase at the end as they attempt to claim value. In this study we find that individualistic negotiators, instead, engage in more distributive behaviors at the beginning of the negotiation and reduce their reliance on distributive behavior as the negotiation progresses. At the same time, individualistic negotiators increase their use of behaviors targeted at creating value, ultimately even surpassing cooperative negotiators.

Suggested Citation

Kern, Mary (Molly) C. and Brett, Jeanne M. and Weingart, Laurie R., Neither Strategic Nor Selfish: Individualistic Negotiators and Their Behavior Over Time (February 2002). IACM 15th Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=304999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304999

Mary (Molly) C. Kern (Contact Author)

Baruch College ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-240
New York, NY 10010
United States
646.312.3673 (Phone)

Jeanne M. Brett

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8075 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

Laurie R. Weingart

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

236A Posner Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7585 (Phone)
412-268-6920 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsia.cmu.edu/andrew/weingart

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