CAPM-Based Company (Mis)valuations

90 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2017 Last revised: 31 Oct 2019

See all articles by Olivier Dessaint

Olivier Dessaint

INSEAD

Jacques Olivier

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Clemens A. Otto

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business

David Thesmar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 24, 2019

Abstract

There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM in capital budgeting -- as recommended in textbooks -- should thus have real effects. For instance, low beta projects should be valued more by CAPM-users than by the market. We test this hypothesis using M&A data and show that bids for low-beta private targets entail lower bidder returns. We provide further support by testing several ancillary predictions. Our analyses suggest that using the CAPM when valuing targets leads to valuation errors (relative to the market's view) corresponding on average to 12% to 33% of the deal values.

Keywords: Capital Budgeting, Valuation, Mergers and Acquisitions, Capital Asset Pricing Model

JEL Classification: G31, G34, G41

Suggested Citation

Dessaint, Olivier and Olivier, Jacques and Otto, Clemens A. and Thesmar, David, CAPM-Based Company (Mis)valuations (October 24, 2019). Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3050928, HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2017-1235, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050928

Olivier Dessaint

INSEAD

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Jacques Olivier

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France
+33 1 3967 7297 (Phone)

Clemens A. Otto

Singapore Management University - Lee Kong Chian School of Business ( email )

469 Bukit Timah Road
Singapore 912409
Singapore

David Thesmar (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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