Understanding Repugnance: Implications for Public Policy

Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Nro. 614

Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3051855

20 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2017

See all articles by Julio Elias

Julio Elias

University of CEMA

Nicola Lacetera

University of Toronto - Strategic Management; University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mario Macis

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: August 1, 2017

Abstract

Understanding the influence of moral repugnance on social decisions is challenging, particularly because in several cases not all of the relevant policy options can be observed. In a series of recent studies, we designed survey experiments to identify individual preferences in morally controversial transactions, with focus on the provision of payments to kidney donors in the United States. We found that providing information on how a price mechanism can help alleviate the organ shortage significantly reduces opposition toward payments for organs. Moreover, we quantified the trade-off that people make between the repugnance and the efficiency of alternative kidney procurement systems. In Elias, Lacetera, Macis and Salardi (2017), finally, we analyzed how the regulation of controversial activities is related to economic development. This paper summarizes these findings and analyzes their main implications for public policy and market design.

Suggested Citation

Elias, Julio and Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario, Understanding Repugnance: Implications for Public Policy (August 1, 2017). Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Nro. 614, Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3051855, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051855 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3051855

Julio Elias (Contact Author)

University of CEMA ( email )

1054 Buenos Aires
Argentina

Nicola Lacetera

University of Toronto - Strategic Management ( email )

Canada

University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management

Canada

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mario Macis

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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