On the Dilution of Market Power
33 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2017
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On the Dilution of Market Power
Date Written: October 2017
Abstract
We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale businesses may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under which the free entry and exit of small firms incentivizes the big firms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, as if they were to behave like in monopolistic competition. We call this result dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specific market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
Keywords: Dominant firms, monopolistically competitive fringe; monopolistic competition, oligopoly; contestable markets
JEL Classification: D43, F12, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sergey Kokovin (Contact Author)
National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia
Philip Ushchev
National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia
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On the Dilution of Market Power
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