Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law

Coase-Sandor Instiitute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 14

Harvard Public Law Working Paper Forthcoming

38 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2017

See all articles by Cass R. Sunstein

Cass R. Sunstein

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: 1993

Abstract

The rise of behavioral economics has important implications for the study of government regulation. Above all, the endogeneity of preferences offers a large area for positive work. Some environmental outcomes can be explained by status quo bias and the endowment effect. These phenomena help account for the asymmetry between old and new risks and the public antipathy toward strategies that create incentives to decrease use of automobiles. Both private and public behavior in the environmental context are an outgrowth of the fact that environmental preferences are endogenous to available opportunities, to shifting social norms, and to past acts of consumption.

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (1993). Coase-Sandor Instiitute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 14, Harvard Public Law Working Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3053957

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)

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Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

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