Dynamic Bank Capital Regulation in Equilibrium
63 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2017 Last revised: 26 Dec 2019
Date Written: February 11, 2018
We study optimal bank regulation in an economy with aggregate uncertainty. Bank liabilities are used as “money” and hence earn lower returns than equity. In laissez faire equilibrium, banks maximize market value, trading off the funding advantage of debt against the risk of costly default. The capital structure is not socially optimal because external costs of distress are not internalized by the banks. The constrained efficient allocation is characterized as the solution to a planner’s problem. Efficient regulation is procyclical, but countercyclical relative to laissez faire. We show that simple leverage constraints can get the decentralized economy close to the constrained efficient outcome.
Keywords: Bank Regulation, Capital Requirements, General Equilibrium, Aggregate Risk
JEL Classification: G21, E32, E58
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