Principles for Regulating Uber and Other Intermediation Platforms in the EU

29 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2017

See all articles by Damien Geradin

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws

Date Written: October 18, 2017

Abstract

Since its entry on the European market, Uber has faced significant regulatory challenges, including lawsuits in several Member States. While some have described the opinions adopted by AG Szpunar in the Spanish and French preliminary ruling cases as a further setback for Uber, this paper shows that even if the CJEU was to follow the approach of AG Szpunar whereby Uber’s activities are transport services rather than information society services as argued by the company and by certain intervening parties in the proceedings, its judgments would have little impact on Uber’s activities. In fact, there is a regulatory momentum for Uber and other intermediation platforms as several Member States have adopted reforms aimed to regulate the services provided by these platforms in a way that allows them to operate at scale and contribute to improve urban mobility, while ensuring that these services are provided in a safe and transparent manner. This paper discussed these reforms and whether they meet good principles of regulation.

Keywords: Uber, intermediation platforms, transport, regulation, competition, efficiencies, externalities, free movement of services, EU law

JEL Classification: D45, D61, D62, D82, K20, K40, L51

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien, Principles for Regulating Uber and Other Intermediation Platforms in the EU (October 18, 2017). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-037; Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3055023

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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