CEO Education and Corporate Environmental Footprint

Posted: 23 Oct 2017 Last revised: 6 Feb 2019

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Birthe Larsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics

Philip Rosenbaum

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 5, 2019

Abstract

We analyze the effect of CEO education on environmental decision-making. Using a unique sample of Danish firms from 1996 to 2012, we find that CEO education significantly improves firms’ energy efficiency. We seek to derive causality using health shocks: the hospitalization of highly educated CEOs induces a drop in energy efficiency, whereas the hospitalization of less educated CEOs does not have any significant effect. Exploring the mechanisms at play, we show that our results are largely driven by advanced education in business degrees. Moreover, we show that CEO education is associated with greater environmental awareness: highly educated CEOs exhibit greater concerns for climate change, as measured by a survey of social preferences, and drive more environmentally efficient cars. Taken together, our findings suggest that education shapes managerial styles giving rise to greater sustainability in corporate actions.

Keywords: CEOs; Education; Climate Change; Energy Efficiency

JEL Classification: G34, I20, J24, Q50

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Bennedsen, Morten and Larsen, Birthe and Rosenbaum, Philip and Rosenbaum, Philip, CEO Education and Corporate Environmental Footprint (February 5, 2019). Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057261 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057261

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Birthe Larsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Porcelænshaven 16 A
Copenhagen F, DK-2000
Denmark
(+45) 61 79 45 25 (Phone)

Philip Rosenbaum

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Porcelænshaven 16A 1. Sal
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/philrosenbaum/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,403
PlumX Metrics