Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania.

58 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2017

See all articles by Charlotte Ringdal

Charlotte Ringdal

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Ingrid Hoem Sjursen

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)

Date Written: October 19, 2017

Abstract

It is frequently assumed that money in the hands of women leads to better outcomes for their children than money in the hands of men. However, empirical and theoretical evidence are mixed. We conduct a novel between-subject lab-in-the-Field experiment to study whether increasing the wife's control over resources causes a couple to allocate more to their child. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power does not increase the share allocated to the child, but leads to more gender-equal allocations to children. Second, time preferences are important in explaining household decision-making; it is better for the child that the most patient spouse has more relative bargaining power. Our results highlight the importance of taking a broader set of preferences into Account when studying household decision-making, and suggest that policy aimed to increase spending on children should target the spouse with preferences most aligned with such spending.

Keywords: Intra-household allocation, female bargaining power, Tanzania

JEL Classification: C92, D13, J13, O12

Suggested Citation

Ringdal, Charlotte and Hoem Sjursen, Ingrid, Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania. (October 19, 2017). NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 19/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057909

Charlotte Ringdal

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Ingrid Hoem Sjursen (Contact Author)

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) ( email )

P.O.Box 6033 Bedriftssenteret
N-5892 Bergen, 5006
Norway

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