Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing
72 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2017 Last revised: 29 Nov 2017
Date Written: October 24, 2017
Incentive problems make assets imperfectly pledgeable. Introducing these problems in an otherwise canonical general equilibrium model yields a rich set of implications. Asset markets are endogenously segmented. There is a basis going always in the same direction, as the price of any risky asset is lower than that of the replicating portfolio of Arrow securities. Equilibrium expected returns are concave in consumption betas, in line with empirical findings. As the dispersion of consumption betas of the risky assets increases, incentive constraints are relaxed and the basis reduced. When hit by adverse shocks, relatively risk tolerant agents sell the safest assets they hold.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation