A Structural Model of Government Formation

55 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2002

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

Keywords: Political Stability, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Comparative Constitutional Design

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio M., A Structural Model of Government Formation (December 2001). PIER Working Paper No. 02-001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305881

Daniel Diermeier

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University ( email )

Department of Economics MS-22
Rice University P.O Box 1892
Houston, TX Texas 77251-1892
United States
7133483453 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://he6.web.rice.edu/

Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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