Social Assets

38 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2002

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. We argue that such analysis is necessary for an understanding of the social arrangements that are consistent with underlying economic fundamentals. We introduce the notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social arrangements governing society. We consider a generational matching model in which an attribute has value in some equilibrium social arrangements (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social arrangements, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.

Note: An updated version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=555769

Keywords: Social Assets, Social Capital, Social Arrangements, Nonmarket Interactions, Social Norms

JEL Classification: D20, D31, D5, J41, Z13

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew, Social Assets (February 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=305891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305891

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

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