What Past U.S. Agency Actions Say About Complexity in Merger Remedies, With an Application to Generic Drug Divestitures

18 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2017

See all articles by Eric Emch

Eric Emch

Bates White Economic Consulting

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Arthur Zhou

Bates White Economic Consulting

Date Written: October 1, 2017

Abstract

We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies—and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and easier to implement. Our analysis suggests that over time this distinction has become somewhat blurred and a better gradation of remedies may be tied to the complexity of the proposed remedy. Divestitures in the market for generic drugs, in particular, are particularly complex, even though the remedies are of a structural, and so their efficacy is hard to ascertain.

Keywords: Antitrust, Mergers, Structural Remedies, Behavioral Remedies, U.S. Enforcement, Generic Drugs

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Emch, Eric and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Zhou, Arthur, What Past U.S. Agency Actions Say About Complexity in Merger Remedies, With an Application to Generic Drug Divestitures (October 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061291 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061291

Eric Emch

Bates White Economic Consulting ( email )

1300 Eye Street NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/

Arthur Zhou

Bates White Economic Consulting ( email )

1300 Eye Street NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
712
rank
389,203
PlumX Metrics