19 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2002
Date Written: January 2004
We develop a dynamic model where each generation in a family can continue operating its inherited production technology or it could hire a professional to do the same. Though the professional is more qualified, his interests are not aligned with the interests of the family. In the context of an overlapping generations framework, we analyze how this tradeoff affects the evolution of the family firm. We find that family firms initially grow in size by accumulating capital and later professionalize their management after reaching a critical size.
Keywords: Family business, agency theory, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G30, F30, J41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bhattacharya , Utpal and Ravikumar, B., From Cronies to Professionals: The Evolution of Family Firms (January 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=306130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.306130