Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage

43 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Tomoya Kazumura

Tomoya Kazumura

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics

Debasis Mishra

Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi - Delhi Centre

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: August 17, 2017

Abstract

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear.

The seller considers the following desiderata for her (allocation) rule, which she terms desirable:

(1) strategy-proofness,

(2) ex-post individual rationality,

(3) equal treatment of equals,

(4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent).

The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) rule is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP rule generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable rule satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for quasilinear domain, where the MWEP rule is the VCG rule, and for various non-quasilinear domains, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain domains with positive income effect.

Keywords: multi-object allocation, strategy-proofness, ex-post revenue maximization, minimum Walrasian equilibrium price, non-quasilinear preferences

JEL Classification: D82, D47, D71

Suggested Citation

Kazumura, Tomoya and Mishra, Debasis and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage (August 17, 2017). Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper No. E-116, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061402

Tomoya Kazumura (Contact Author)

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

Debasis Mishra

Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi - Delhi Centre ( email )

7 S .J. S.
Sansanwal Marg
New Delhi, 110016
India

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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