Diagnosing the Italian Disease

82 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2017 Last revised: 25 Jun 2023

See all articles by Bruno Pellegrino

Bruno Pellegrino

Columbia University - Columbia Business School; University of Chicago - George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: October 2017

Abstract

Italy’s aggregate productivity abruptly stopped growing in the mid-1990s. This stop represents a puzzle, as it occurred at a time of stable macroeconomic conditions. In this paper, we investigate the possible causes of this “disease” by using sector and firm-level data. We find that Italy’s productivity disease was most likely caused by the inability of Italian firms to take full advantage of the ICT revolution. While many institutional features can account for this failure, a prominent one is the lack of meritocracy in the selection and rewarding of managers. Unfortunately, we also find that the prevalence of loyalty-based management in Italy is not simply the result of a failure to adjust, but an optimal response to the Italian institutional environment. Italy’s case suggests that familism and cronyism can be serious impediments to economic development even for a highly industrialized nation.

Suggested Citation

Pellegrino, Bruno and Zingales, Luigi, Diagnosing the Italian Disease (October 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23964, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061645

Bruno Pellegrino (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
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University of Chicago - George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679
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Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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Chicago, IL 60637
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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