The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects

17 Pages Posted: 13 May 2002

See all articles by Amihai Glazer

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Vesa Kanniainen

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 2002

Abstract

We consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firm's ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm constrained in firing will prefer a risk-free project over a risky one, but may prefer the riskier of two risky projects.

Keywords: Project Choice, Labor Protection

JEL Classification: M13, J23

Suggested Citation

Glazer, Amihai and Kanniainen, Vesa, The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects (March 2002). CESifo Working Paper No. 689. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=306300

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-854-6563 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

Vesa Kanniainen (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358-0-9-1911 (Phone)
+358-0-191-8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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