Underpricing in the Euro Area Corporate Bond Market: New Evidence from Post-Crisis Regulation and Quantitative Easing

55 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2017 Last revised: 10 Jan 2019

See all articles by Tobias Rischen

Tobias Rischen

University of Mannheim - Finance Area; BMW Group - Treasury Department

Erik Theissen

University of Mannheim - Finance Area

Date Written: January 05, 2019

Abstract

We conduct the most extensive study of underpricing in the euro area bond market so far and find strong evidence of underpricing. In cross-sectional regressions we find patterns that are consistent with bookbuilding-based theories of underpricing and inconsistent with liquidity-based explanations. The underpricing has increased considerably during the financial crisis and has remained at an elevated level since. We also show that secondary market liquidity in the euro area bond market is significantly lower in the post-crisis period than pre-crisis. These results are consistent with recent US evidence and may represent unintended side effects of new regulation enacted in the wake of the financial crisis, such as Basel III and the Volcker Rule. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the ECB’s asset purchase programs have led to a decrease in underpricing.

Keywords: Underpricing, Bond Markets, Primary Market, EMU, Post-Crisis Regulation, ECB, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Quantitative Easing, Asset Purchase Programs, CSPP

JEL Classification: G12, G32, E58

Suggested Citation

Rischen, Tobias and Theissen, Erik, Underpricing in the Euro Area Corporate Bond Market: New Evidence from Post-Crisis Regulation and Quantitative Easing (January 05, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063310 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063310

Tobias Rischen (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Finance Area ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

BMW Group - Treasury Department ( email )

Munich
Germany

Erik Theissen

University of Mannheim - Finance Area ( email )

Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
165
rank
176,444
Abstract Views
766
PlumX Metrics