Ownership and Pay in Britain

28 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2017

See all articles by Andrew Pendleton

Andrew Pendleton

Durham University Business School

Alex Bryson

UCL ; National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)

Howard Gospel

King's College London - The Management Centre

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Date Written: December 1, 2017


Drawing on principal-agent perspectives on corporate governance, the article examines whether employees’ hourly pay is related to ownership dispersion. Using linked employee‐workplace data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011, and using a variety of techniques including interval regression and propensity score matching, average hourly pay is found to be higher in dispersed ownership workplaces. The premium is broadly constant across most of the wage distribution, but falls at the 95th percentile to become statistically non‐significant. This contrasts with earlier papers which indicate that higher level employees are the primary beneficiaries of higher pay from dispersed ownership. The dispersed ownership pay premium is not readily explained by efficiency wage perspectives but is consistent with a managerial desire for a ‘quiet life’.

Suggested Citation

Pendleton, Andrew and Bryson, Alex and Gospel, Howard, Ownership and Pay in Britain (December 1, 2017). British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 55, Issue 4, pp. 688-715, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063625 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12241

Andrew Pendleton (Contact Author)

Durham University Business School ( email )

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Alex Bryson

UCL ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://iris.ucl.ac.uk/iris/browse/profile?upi=ABRYS65

National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/staff/staffdetail.php?StaffID=307

Howard Gospel

King's College London - The Management Centre ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NN
United Kingdom
44 020 78484121 (Phone)

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