Ronald Dworkin's Criticism of Pragmatism

Abstract

This article seeks to provide a critical analysis of Ronald Dworkin’s views on pragmatism, insofar as he evolves in a legal culture marked by considerations that arise from pragmatist philosophy and is also himself described by some scholars as a pragmatist. How does he view pragmatism? What are the criticisms he addresses to pragmatist theories? How can we nuance those criticisms?

With the aim of examining the relevance of Dworkin’s position on pragmatism, we will proceed to a brief overview of the use of the term “pragmatism” in legal literature, before directly exploring Dworkin’s criticisms of pragmatist philosophy as well as the nuances to those criticisms that we can highlight.

Keywords: Dworkin, Pragmatism, Law, Interpretation, Legal Pragmatism, Positivism, James, Peirce, Adjudication, Integrity, Judicial Activism, Rights