Is Ronald Dworkin a Pragmatist?

Abstract

We seek here to provide a critical analysis of the claim that the theory of interpretation of Ronald Dworkin is in line with the tradition of pragmatist philosophy. We will attempt to determine if some aspects of his works can be shown to display pragmatist elements. Can Ronald Dworkin be called a pragmatist? Does he, perhaps unwittingly, contribute to a philosophy in line with the theories of Peirce, James and Dewey?

In this paper, we will first identify specific pragmatist influences in Dworkin's theory. We will try to demonstrate that by giving a central place to interpretation in his legal theory, Dworkin sometimes follows a pragmatist approach.

Second, we will attempt to establish that the compatibility of Dworkin's theses with pragmatism is nonetheless limited. Indeed, this apparent compatibility would seem to be due rather to a broad use of the term "pragmatism" than to a real commitment to pragmatist theses. We will seek to prove that if Dworkin's thought sometimes follows a pragmatist approach, he cannot himself be described as a pragmatist, in the classical sense employed by pragmatist philosophy.

Keywords: Dworkin, Pragmatism, Law, Interpretation, Legal Pragmatism, Positivism, James, Peirce, Adjudication, Integrity, Judicial Activism, Rights