Corporate Social Responsibility and the Assessment by Auditors of the Risk of Material Misstatement

39 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2017

See all articles by Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy

Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Kurt A. Desender

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Mircea Epure

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Date Written: October/November 2017

Abstract

This paper investigates whether, and how, firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance influences the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement level by analysing their pricing decision (i.e., audit fees). Using a panel data set of 12,330 firms from 28 countries over the period 2003–2012 and different measures of CSR performance, we find a U‐shaped relationship between firms' CSR performance and audit fees. This result suggests that there is an optimal level of CSR performance that minimizes the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, which in turn lowers the need for greater auditor effort; that is why auditors charge firms significantly less when their CSR performance is at the optimal level. Finally, we also show that the optimal level of CSR performance varies with the degree of environmental dynamism, ownership concentration and leverage.

Keywords: audit fees, corporate social responsibility (CSR), CSR performance, risk of material misstatement

Suggested Citation

LópezPuertas‐Lamy, Mónica and Desender, Kurt A. and Epure, Mircea, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Assessment by Auditors of the Risk of Material Misstatement (October/November 2017). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 44, Issue 9-10, pp. 1276-1314, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064367 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12268

Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Kurt A. Desender

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

Calle de Madrid, 123
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Mircea Epure

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://mirceaepure.com

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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