Buyers' Ability and Discretion in Public Procurement: An Empirical Analysis on Standardised Medical Devices

45 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2017 Last revised: 8 Oct 2019

See all articles by Alessandro Bucciol

Alessandro Bucciol

University of Verona - Department of Economics; Netspar

Riccardo Camboni

University of Padua

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padua - Department of Economics and Management, DSEA

Date Written: November 3, 2017

Abstract

Using a dataset of medical devices purchased by Italian Public Buyers (PBs), for each purchase, we measure the difference between each item's price and its marginal cost. We define PBs' ability in purchasing as PBs' fixed effect (FE) on that difference. We find that average prices vary substantially amongst PBs, and this variation is largely captured by PBs' FE. We then exploit the exogenous termination of the mandatory reference price regime to assess how discretion affects procurement performance, given each PB's ability. Our results highlight that reduced PBs' discretion - in presence of mandatory prices - determines efficiency gains and losses for low- and high-ability PBs, respectively.

Keywords: Public Procurement, Medical Devices, Buyer's Ability, Reference Price, Regulatory Discretion

JEL Classification: D44, D73, H57, I18

Suggested Citation

Bucciol, Alessandro and Camboni, Riccardo and Valbonesi, Paola, Buyers' Ability and Discretion in Public Procurement: An Empirical Analysis on Standardised Medical Devices (November 3, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064621 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3064621

Alessandro Bucciol (Contact Author)

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

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Verona, 37129
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HOME PAGE: http://www.sites.google.com/site/abucciol/

Netspar ( email )

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Riccardo Camboni

University of Padua ( email )

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Padova, Vicenza 2-35122
Italy

Paola Valbonesi

University of Padua - Department of Economics and Management, DSEA ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy
+39+049+8274058 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.decon.unipd.it

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